John A Lynn in his excellent book “Battle” speaks of what he calls the illusion of chivalry. One the one hand is the medieval concept of chivalry and on the other is the brutal reality of war. I think our perception of this so called illusion derives from how we see the makeup  medieval armies. Dr. Lynn describes the army of Edward III as composed of “2,700 knights and squires, men of aristocratic and landed backgrounds.” Serving along with them are 12,000 commoners including 7,000 peasant longbowmen. The problem with this description is the assumption that medieval mounted warriors were composed of aristocrats, knights and squires.

Even when feudal obligation was the source of raising mounted forces  those forces were always composed of a mix of knights and commoners. When historians write that the aristocracy fought on horseback they are correct. Where they get tripped up is in assuming that all who fought on horseback were knights and squires. This is simply wrong. In the charters of cities and religious organizations was often the requirement of these charter holders to provide mounted troops. These non-noble mounted warriors were called sergeants. Thus medieval mounted forces consisted of noble and non-noble warriors. To subsume all mounted warriors under the title of aristocrat simply does not reflect the reality of high medieval warfare.

In the 14^th century we begin to see a terminological shift in the naming of mounted forces. The older knight/sergeant dichotomy began to be replaced with a single term ‘man-at-arms’. Because of their erroneous concept that mounted warfare meant aristocratic warfare, historians used ‘man-at-arms’ and ‘aristocracy’ interchangeably. They assumed that that the proponents of chivalry also made up the mounted component of armies of the Hundred Year’s War. They didn’t. That is to say very few of them did.

In the thirteenth century, requirements for providing mounted contingents began to shift from feudal and personal obligation to an obligation based on property (primarily land). If one had x amount of property one had to supply a bowman. If one had a great amount than x one had to supply a man-at-arms. Under Edward II the property owner could supply an archer or man-at-arms. If he had even more property he had to provide two men-at-arms, etc. Under Edward III it was the property owner that had to be so equipped. Three studies of English counties showed that property ownership among non-nobles called franklins, and the lower esquires were about equal.. This meant that franklins and esquires who had property qualifying them to provide men-at-arms had to present themselves armed and trained as a man-at-arms. Depending on the amount of property a non-noble or franklin had to provide either a bowman or a man-at-arms. So the simple assumption that a man-at-arms meant a noble is quite wrong.

I applaud Dr. Lynn for the focus on the effects of culture on warfare. What cripples his approach is to put this information into the old wineskins of economic class. I think there is more benefit by following up Roland Mousnier’s idea of a society of orders. Nevertheless one needs to recognize that in the 14^th- and 15^th-centuries there developed two different militarized sub-societies. The first was peopled by the high aristocracy where military expertise was an important value. However, this expertise was showcased in tournaments not war. The second military society was composed of the lower orders of franklins and esquires. These made up the professional warriors of the Hundred Years War. It was this group that had no interest in the rules of chivalry. They were there to gain resources in any way possible.

I apologize for letting this blog go so long. Maybe I don’t have the right disposition for mainting a blog. However I will try to do better in the future. Now to continue my discussion of the myth of the longbowmen. When we turn to the smaller battles of the Hundred Years War the lack of dominance by the longbow is readily seen. Take the battle of Mauron, 1352. The French attacked the English archers on horseback. They broke the archers who fled. Another battalion of French attacked the English on foot.  However, it was the English men-at-arms which won the battle. They finally beat off the French. The thing to notice here is that the bowmen could not stand up to a cavalry attack.

Four years later at Constance (1356) The French crossbowmen had their pavises this time and they wore their armor. So protected, the longbow fire was quite ineffective. They simply waited for the longbows to run out of arrows then they returned the fire. The longbowmen quickly hid behind their men at arms. With the French crossbowmen supporting the French dismounted attack, the English were defeated this time.

Nogent 1359, the French made their initial attack on horseback but had to fall back. Then, on foot, the French attacked the English bowmen. The French were so well armored and with them holding their shields a loft that English arrows could not hurt them. The French broke the archers position and when the archers broke and ran the French mounted men-at-arms rode the archers down and slaughtered the, Once more the English men-at-arms could not hold and were defeated.

The chroniclers who wrote about the battle of Auray clearly pointed out the English bowmen were quite ineffective. The French men-at-arms were too well armored and shielded. The French were finally defeated but they were defeated through a combination of English men-at-arms and Breton cavalry.

The longbow was a mature technology even when it appeared first on the battlefield. It could not keep up with the armor improvements. By 1415, at Agincourt, the armor of the French was so well developed they no longer needed their shields. What Constance showed was when crossbowmen were properly armored and had their pavises, the English longbowmen were no match for them.

Luckily for the English, the French raised their military forces a bit differently than did the English. The English military contracts specified how many men-at-arms and archers were to be raised. Thus, English forces were always composed of both arms. The French, on the other hand, contracted with men-at-arms separately from crossbowmen. There were a number of occasions in which French men-at-arms had to fight without crossbowmen simply because there was not enough money with which to raise units of crossbowmen.

The French men-at-arms were quick to improve their armor and make tactical changes. They adapted their attack tactics to include dismounted attacks and to carry their shields over their heads much in the manner of the Roman tortoise. The one thing the French couldn’t match was the steadiness of the English man-at-arms. When the English won, they won because of their men-at-arms not their longbowmen.

With regards to Robert Hardy:

“It had been hard to train him to his best; it proved impossible to keep him to it; but as his best there was no man in the world to beat him, no matter the odds against him; and his breed lasted long beyond the longbow; he used the musket and the rifle; he endured in 1915 the same, and worse, than his forefathers suffered in 1415.”

This kind of jingoism is hardly history. And,

“When two such armies met again ten years later at Poitiers there were almost no crossbows on the French side. They were remembered as useless.”

his historical knowledge I find to be lacking.

During the Hundred Year’s War, French chivalry fell victim at Crecy (1346) to new English tactics that took advantage of the peasant longbow in defensive positions that supported dismounted knights. A decade later the French responded at Poitiers (1356) not by confronting the problem [p 339] posed by English longbowmen but by mimicking the English knights and dismounting. It was as though they could only interpret their earlier defeat as being wrought by their social equals, the English knights. The result was that the longbowmen enjoyed even better targets. Sixty years later, at Agincourt (1415), the French repeated their aristocratic mistake. [p 340]

Look closely at how our historian describe the combatants. Peasants use longbows and knights don’t. Notice the social interpretation of the combatants. What the author is using here is an outworn stereotypic social order and placing it anachronistically over the fourteenth and fifteenth century military order. Were there peasants at this time? Of course. Were there knights? Again, of course. However, these two facts are almost irrelevant. There were knights among the men-at-arms in the English army but they were always a minority. At one point they only made up 5% of the army. One might say the term ‘knight’ was used in a more generic sense to represent the nobility even the lower nobility. Again, irrelevant. Mounted troops were not raised on the basis of their nobility.

Men-at-arms were raised on the basis of property. It didn’t matter if the property owner was noble or not. If he held the requisite amount of property, he was to be armed with the accoutrements of a man-at-arms. The raising of cavalry had little to do with knighthood.

At this time, many of the landowners in England were non-noble and were known as franklins (yeoman of a latter period). Investigations into several counties showed franklins were on the same financial level as squires. This meant men-at-arms would have been raised from franklin estates as from estates of the squirarchy. As such, men-at-arms were composed of both groups: non-nobles and minor nobles. To equate men-at-arms with knights is an error. To describe them as knights is to falsify reality.

To return to longbowmen, they were peasants only in the sense they were farmers. Specifically, they were property owning franklins. Franklins who owned property but not enough to warrant supplying a man-at-arms had to supply an archer on horseback. Franklins supplied both men-at-arms as well as archers. The only difference is the amount of property owned by a particular franklin. As a result archers and men-at-arms were as likely as not to came from the same property owning group. To superimpose a social order which had no relevance to the military reality is to fail to understand the military social realities of the times.

Our author has posited two ideas. Men-at-arms and bowmen represented two different cultures: knights and peasants. He goes on to assert the problem the French had is that they reacted to their social equals rather than the real danger: the archers. Here he presents the second idea: the longbow was the real danger on the late medieval battlefield.

As time went on, the French came to copy the English system of raising cavalry. Edward III, writing to Sir Thomas Lucy, wrote that when they had arrived at Crecy, the enemy appeared with 12,000 men-at-arms of which 8,000 were gentlemen, knights, and squires. This leaves 4,000 non-noble men-at-arms. Property not nobility became the determining factor. Therefore, it is logical to assume that French cavalry came from the same property owning groups as the English, French men-at-arms probably represented both noble property owners and non-noble property owners. This was hardly a group vastly different from those property owners who were the bowmen. To force a cultural perspective vastly different between archers and men-at-arms is not a functional approach to understanding the military realities of the Hundred Year’s War.

Let us now take up the issue of what our author thinks to be the real threat in these wars. Here we come to the beloved myth of the English longbow. The myth of the longbow rests upon the holy trinity. Not that Holy Trinity. It is the holy trinity of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt.“ It must be said that the battle of Crecy was won in great measure to the longbow working in conjunction with dismounted men-at-arms. This was the classic infantry versus cavalry engagement. Poitiers was not.

At Poitiers the English fought from an enclosed position difficult for cavalry to fight through. The French dismounted and attacked on foot. They were finally defeated by a small unit of mounted English men-at-arms who outflanked the French. There is the account of archers firing on a French mounted force but they had to be reposition because their firing was ineffective. Other than this event, there is no indication the longbows effected the battle at all. Then we have the classic attack by French cavalry at Agincourt to open the battle. Once the cavalry van was defeated there is no indication that longbow fire contributed at all in defeating the enemy. Some sources say the archers dropped their bows and arrows to join in the fray. Others say the archers had run out of arrows and then joined the fray. Either description highlights the ineffectiveness of the longbow. In the event that both bow and arrows were dropped, such a thing would only have happened because that archers saw the ineffectiveness of their fire. If the archers had run out of arrows, it would have been a clear indication that the archery fire was unable to influence the course of the foot battle.

Viewing all three battles a pattern clearly emerges. Bow fire is effective against mounted attacks but much less so against dismounted attacks. Our author’s comments that by slavishly following the example the English men-at-arms, the French, by dismounting, were failing to acknowledge the real threat of the longbow does not bear out. The longbow’s failure was in meeting the threat of the dismounted attack. When viewed in this manner, the longbow was not the uber weapon that modern English speaking historian make it out to be.

Then how did the myth of the longbow come to be. I believe this myth gained strength in the first half of the twentieth century. I think in part it was a reflection of historical influences by some Marxist thoughts melding with the early growth of the social sciences of this time. The idea arose that historical change was the product of conflict between the oppressed and their oppressors. It was easy to see the peasants as the oppressed and the knights as the oppressors. Historical change reflected the growth in power of the oppressed. Gradually it was the archers, as representative of the oppressed, that became the heroes. Thus the myth of the longbow was created.
.
Rich

I should have gone with my first impressions. Mr. Brecher proceeded to, for the next third of the post, describe some kind of fuzzy fantasy about Vice President Cheney as a Persian mole. In my estimation this section was simply immature and stupid.

Finally Mr. Brecher writes something that has a semblance of rationality. “All these claims that Iran is helping the insurgents really make my head spin. Of course they’re helping. They’d be insane if they weren’t. If somebody invades the country next door, any state worth mentioning has to act.”

OK. It’s time to step back and look at this assertion. What Mr. Brecher is saying is that the US invaded Iraq and some of the Iraqi people have risen up to save mother Iraq. The US has sustained casualties but not near the casualties the Iraqi people have from these “insurgents.” Mr. Brecher, evidently, would have us believe that the Iraqi people rose up in response to the US invasion and started killing each other. Now either these are the stupidest, most brain-dead “insurgents” in the history of the world or Mr. Brecher doesn’t understand the term “insurgents.” My vote is for the latter.

At this point one needs to ask one’s self, if Mr. Brecher hasn’t got a clue as to what an insurgent is how is he going to be able to present anything intelligent about the Iraq war. The quick answer is, he can’t. But let’s move on anyway. Mr. Brecher continues on just gushing over how Iran is in the cat seat. What Iran actually did is prove the American Right correct. When Iran flipped its finger at the UN and the UN did nothing, they proved what the Right had said all along: the UN is as useless as tits on boar.

So here we have Mr. Brecher running around flapping his arms while screaming “Iran has won!”, “Iran has won!” All the while the war continues. Mr. Brecher can you spell cognitive dissonance. You see Mr. Brecher, the US can bring down the government of Iran anytime it wants without losing a solider and without dropping a bomb. Iran has a critical weakness. And I’m surprised you don’t know about it. (That’s a lie. After reading your comments, I’m not surprised at all.) While Iran is sitting on top of all that oil, it can’t use a drop of it. They have no refineries. They must ship oil out, have it refined, and then ship gas back in. Without that gas being shipped in the government of Iran would collapse in days. Why do you think the US has packed away record amounts of oil reserves. Think about it.

But now we are coming to the best part. This is the part where Mr. Brecher wants to teach us about the Thirty Year’s War. Alright! This is right up my alley. He starts out with what I’ve come to discover is one of his formulaic questions: Who won the Thirty Years War? His profound answer: France and England. ENGLAND!? At the time of the treaties of Westphalia England was up to it’s ears in civil war. England wasn’t even a party to the treaties. The big winner was the Dutch! They came out with their independence and a colonial empire no other European country could match. By the end of the Thirty Year’s War their fleets were bringing in wealth from all over the globe. They even supplanted the Venetians as the major traders to the Port. It looks like Mr. Brecher tripped on his own hubris and fell flat on his face once again.

This brings us to War Nerd’s guidelines for “who wins wars.”

1) In a big bloodbath like the Thirty Years War or WWI, the winner is usually the powers that don’t fight.

Since the Dutch fought for eighty years trying to drive the Spanish off, that guideline sucks.

2) The biggest loser is almost always the country on whose territory the war is fought.

The fight was on Dutch soil proving that guideline sucks. But we have more. In Iraq, 47 countries have reestablished there embassies in Iraq. The Iraq government employs 1.2 million Iraqi. 3100 schools have been renovated, Iraq’s higher educational structure consists of 20 Universities, 46 Institutes or colleges and 4 research centers, all currently operating. Iraqi Navy, which is operational, has 5-100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment. Iraq’s Air Force consists of three operational squadrons, which includes 9 reconnaissance and 3 US C-130 transport aircraft (under Iraqi operational control). Iraqi Police Service has over 55,000 fully trained and equipped police officers. 5 Police Academies in Iraq that produce over 3500 new officers each 8 weeks. There are more than 1100 building projects going on in Iraq. They include 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations, 22 oil facilities, 93 water facilities and 69 electrical facilities. 96% of Iraqi children under the age of 5 have received the first 2 series of polio vaccinations. 4.3 million Iraqi children were enrolled in primary school by mid October last year. There are 1,192,000 cell phone subscribers in Iraq and phone use has gone up 158%. Iraq has an independent media that consists of 75 radio stations, 180 newspapers and 10 television stations. The Baghdad Stock Exchange opened in June of 2004. 2 candidates in the Iraqi presidential election had a televised debate. I guess that guideline really sucks.

3) In a regional war, the big winner will be any neighboring states that can stay out of the war and work out supply contracts.

How does that work since the US holds the majority of contracts? Let’s mark this guideline as not well thought out.

4) However, if there’s an ethnic spillover, like Turkey has with the Kurds, this relationship can backfire.

Turkey gave us preliminary permission to cross their border into Hussein’s Iraq. Then, at the last moment rescinded that permission throwing our whole invasion time table out of whack. As I see it, Turkey is a big boy and can take care of himself. So, let’s mark this as not being relevant.

5) The worst thing a major power can do is go to war alone for “moral” reasons.

Here comes the obligatory “go to war alone” assertion. This has been shown to be so bogus so many times I’m not going to waste my time on it. But as far as going to war for “moral” reasons, this is a joke. Can you say “We went for the oil”? Oh we didn’t go so that we ourselves could take over the oil. We went over there so fanatic Islamic terrorists and those who would work with them could not control the oil. We went there for our own self interest. That’s the only reason to go to war. Good grief Mr. Brecher, you really don’t know much about war.

You don’t know what insurgents are. You think witty juvenile rhetoric can take the place of reasoned discourse. You know nothing about the Thirty Years War in spite of bringing it up. You guidelines of war suck. Let’s face it, your posts comes off showing you don’t know much at all. The only real question is what Dr. Grimsley saw in this immature prattle. Oh well, we can all have a bad day. I won’t hold it against him. His blog is still one of my favorites.

“We lost the Iraq war.” This is such a lame statement that only a US senator could have made it. Now, back to the longbow.

Rich

The caracole is not a battlefield tactic. It was a cavalry maneuver. It had nothing particular to do with firing pistols. It was a maneuver by which troops splits in half; one half goes right and the other half goes left. Notice how Cruso uses the term ‘carracol’.

“If one companie of Cuirassiers be to fight against another, your enemie charging you in full career, you are to make a Carracoll, that is, you divide your bodie by the half ranks, and so suddenly open to the right and left.”

The caracole can be combined with firing a pistol by ranks. This is best effective against a stationary target such as pikes. The idea there is to disrupt the pikes enough to then be able to go in with the sword. But to say this was a tactic that defined how the Dutch cavalry attacked all opponents is clearly incorrect.

One could say that the Dutch changed their method of attack as a result of the effectiveness of the Gustavus’ tactical reforms. But this seems unlikely. Gustav entered Germany in 1630. Cruso wrote his treatise in 1632. There does not seem to be enough time for a complete revamping of Dutch cavalry tactics. Also, one does not have to look to Gustav for the origin of the Dutch tactics. As John Lynn has pointed out, in his article “Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660,” Louis IV reorganized the French cavalry to go in with shock:

“By temperament and professional conviction, Henri IV could not accept the sterile caracole. He reshaped French cavalry formations and tactics, reducing the depth of squadrons to six ranks, and even to five. At Coutras (1587) and Ivry (1590) his cavalry used their firearms for an initial shot, but then charged home with the sword at the gallop.”

This is precisely the tactic that Ward, Cruso and Markham seem to be describing for the Dutch cavalry. Given that there was a tremendous influx of French volunteers fighting on the Dutch side in their wars against Spain, it is much more likely that Dutch cavalry tactics were influenced by Louis IV’s tactical changes than those of Gustav.

But wait! There’s more! First we have to go back to Ward. As the troops prepared to fire, Ward instructed them as to the manner in which they were to fire.

“Present and give fire. Having your pistoll in your hand, With your finger upon the tricker, you are to incline the Muzzel (with a steady eye) towards the Marke not suddenly but by degrees, according to the distance you ride, before a necessity of discharging shall be, you are not to give fire directly forwards the horses head, but in a diameter [diagonal] line, by his right side, turning his right hand so as the locke of the Pistoll may bee upward, and having a true view of the Marke, draw the tricker and let flye.”

“The Cuirassire, in fight is to stive to gaine a right side of his Enemie being most proper to discharge his Pistols against him. The Harquebuziers and Carabines, must contrarily strive to get the left side of their enemies.”

In other words, the trooper was not to head his horse directly towards the enemy horse but was to direct his horse between the enemy horses so he can give diagonal fire. Not only was the trooper to fire at the trot and charge at the gallop, he was to direct his horse between the oncoming enemy horse. There is a secondary benefit. Horses have a blind spot directly in front of them. That blind spot goes out to about four feet. They also can see independently with each eye. It is called monocular. Thus the horse can track to the two horses on either side of him but not directly in front if they are within four feet. By seeing what’s going on, the horse is less likely to be skittish and hard to handle. Firing diagonally rather than straight ahead takes advantage of the natural way in which horses perceive what is going on around them at this range.

Before we leave the subject let’s talk about the organization of a troop of horse. Both Ward and Markham recommend a troop be 120 strong and formed into six ranks. Historians often remark about the progressive development of cavalry in terms of declining ranks. In other words, the more advanced tactical formation is that which has fewer ranks. Cavalry become more effective when they lose the extra ranks. This perspective develops from a lack of understanding of the function of the extra ranks. For one thing, the extra ranks allow them to extend their front by doubling their ranks Also, a troop of horse formed in six ranks is divided into four commands, one command for every two ranks. The function of the rear ranks is to protect the unit from flank or rear attacks. Ward:

“ … or if (being in skirmish with the enemy) any shot should be drawne out to give fire upon them in the reare; then the two hindmost rankes of a horse, may peckiere about and put them to retreate, and the foure most ranks in the front may be the better able to prosecute their fight.”

To many times historians criticizes without fully understanding the function of a particular formation or tactic.

What our writers have given is what a cavalry charge should be. Without evidence to the contrary I will have to assume that what these writers describe is indeed how cavalry charges were conducted. Frequently historians dismiss ‘theoretical’ writings because they don’t understand the function of what is being described. A lack of understand of the ‘theoretical’ writings have led historians to erroneous conclusions concerning 16th- and 17th- battle. This has led them to erroneous ideas about the nature change.

Rich

“Just to prove that language is gendered, every one of these four books consistently refers to the horse as “him”, even when they don’t specify a preference for stallions, geldings, or mares.”

Gavin, there was a good reason for using ‘him’ for cavalry horses. Cavalry horses were almost all male. If you included mares in your cavalry and any of them came into estrous there would not be a stallion in the whole army that would be worth a damn. Ergo, no mares.

Now let us turn our thoughts to discussing military manuals. This is the theory aspect that Gavin talks about. I’m not focusing particularly on Gavin’s approach to these types of documents. However, how he once approached these manuals is very indicative of how early modern military historians have generally thought of these documents.

“Since I was an undergraduate I’ve been aware of the potential difference between theory and practice, but I used to think that if theory didn’t agree with practice, it could simply be discounted as ‘wrong’.”

Gavin no longer approaches these texts in this manner but many military historians still do. The attitude is that these works are just theory. Their attitude is that since these men didn’t have military experience their ideas were created in a military vacuum and therefore we have little to learn from them. They fail to understand the relationship between theory and practice.

Let me turn to me little red dictionary for a definition of theory. Theory is “a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something.” Every aspect of war first began with a question and an idea (the solution). In order to convey the practicality of the solution it had to be converted into a theory. Thus all human created aspects of war first began as theory. Another way to say this is that all human made aspects of war were first created in the human mind. This is the bedrock of historical change.

There is a dynamic relationship between theory and practice. There is no practice without theory. The viability of theory can only be proved in the furnace of practice. This is not to say all theoretical ideas, in these books, were of value. Some were some were not. The trick is to know the gold from the feldspar. What needs to be done is to discover the commonalities that reside in these books. It is the commonalities which will provide the building blocks for understanding the 16th- & 17th-century military mind. In order to understand military developments at this time you must understand the military mind of this time. The critical component for all this is the military writings of this period. This includes military manuals. Far too often historians have attempted to understand military developments through their own 21st-century minds. Far too many attempt this understanding without a military perspective, either of the present or of the past. They wind up with ideas that seem reasonable to their academic perspective but utterly fail from a military perspective.

Another reason to look at these manuals is to learn the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of an event in the event that a written episode only provides the ‘what’. They give us the background to help understand what is going on.

I will be working with Robert Ward and Gervaise Markham. I cannot find my Cruso and John Vernon’s writing I do not have. First I want to address Gavin’s comment about the writings of these men.

“The most important things to remember are that these are prescriptive books which claimed to set out how things should be done, and that they are not necessarily based on any practical experience.”

I agree with Gavin that these books are prescriptive but then all training manuals are. As to ‘practical’ experience of the writers, it all depends on how you define ‘practical’. They had a much more intimate knowledge of horses than do most of us. They grew up around horses, as men of property, they probably trained horse and used horses on a daily basis. So a lot of what they recommend they have done themselves. As men of property, they may also have served in the militia and attended musters. Musters would be the place where units of cavalry would train to go through their passes. They may well have spent time in the Dutch wars. It was quite fashionable to spend some time there as a free gentleman, that is not assigned to a particular unit. I don’t think we should assume because they hadn’t been a member of a regiment they were without practical experience.

Since my definition of ‘shock’ is different than the one Gavin seems to be using I won’t address that part of his argument. Remember shock is any attempt to move into contact with the enemy for the purpose of fighting hand-to-hand combat (melee). Thus I will look at how Ward and Markham envision this happening.

According to Ward it is the responsibility of the Captain of a troop to insure,

“ … his horse so well managed that he will stand constantly without rage or distemper: then he is to be made sensible (by yeelding the body, or thrusting forwards the riders legges) when to put himslef forwards into a short or large trot; then how by the even stroke of both: is spurers to passe into a swift Carrire, then how to gallop the field in large ringes; midles or lesse rings, either to turne with speed upon the one or the other hand; then to put him into a gentle gallop right forth in an even line, and suddenly to stop, and upon the halfe stop to turne swiftly and roundly.” [p 280]

In other words, troopers should be experienced in maneuvering their charges at the trot and at the gallop. Training is done both in the ring and on the open field. Notice how central the gallop is to the training warhorse was.

“In this next ; progresse we are to observe foure kindes of managing a Horse to fit him for service.
First when you make your Horse double his turnes.
Secondly when you gallop the field, making him wave in and out,as is used in single skirmish.
Thirdly when you make him leape a loft, fetching divers faltes or curveates; but this is not so proper to teach to a horse for service.
Fourthly when you pace, trot, and gallop, him too and fro in one path, the length of twenty or thirty paces, turning him at each end thereof, either with single turn, whole turne, or double turne, (this is termede manage and in this word there is three things observable, as first the manage with halfe rest, that is to cause your horse at the end of every managing path, to stop and then advance twise together, and at the second bound to turne, whereby you rest one bound.” [p 289]

I thought this next part was interesting. The trooper is to train his horse to immediately go from a standing stop to a full gallop with one command. This allows the trooper to quickly break into a full gallop at any time. Therefore it was possible to allow an enemy to approach and then immediately break into a gallop to take advantage of any disruption of the enemy’s approach. Also notice how the horse is trained to stop from a full gallop. I’m sure many of us have seen this at the calf-roping events at rodeos. After the calf is roped, the horse straightens his front legs and his buttocks almost meet the ground.

“At the end of the Carriere path, let your Horse stop and advance , and at the second bound; turne him fairly and softly upon the right hand, and to stay a little while then suddenly with a lively voyce, cry hay, hay, put him forwards with both Spures at once, forcing him to runne all the path as swift as possibly may be, just up to the end, to the intent he may stop on his buttocks.”

In the charge itself, keeping order is of supreme importance. This is why Ward recommends waiting and allowing the enemy to come to you. The more distance a troop of horse must cover, the more chance there is that the unit will lose much of it’s order.

“When the enemie shall charge you with one of his Troopes, doe not you rush forth to meete them, but if your ground be of advantage keepe it; if not advance softly forwards; untill the enemy be within 100 paces of you, and then fall into your Careire, by this meanes your horse will be in breath and good order, when as the Enemie will be to seeke.” [p 281]

When you get within 15 – 20 feet you fire while at the trot. “… a Cuirassiere usually giveth his charge upon the trot, and very seldome upon the Gallop” I agree with Gavin that Ward means firing when he uses the word ‘charge. But this has always confused me a bit. The trot is such a jarring gait. When I hunted coyotes on the ranch, I always pushed my mustang into a slow loping gait. It was a much smooth gait and wouldn’t affect my aiming as much. However, I now see the Ward’s recommendation of the trot has more to do with not overrunning your target. You come in firing both pistols then drop them and go for your sword. The pistols had line attached to them and the saddle. The sword would be dangling from one wrist as you fired. After dropping the pistols you twisted your wrist and grabbed the handle of the swords. They probably practiced this so often that it was almost second nature to them. Thus they would quickly go from pistols to sword in almost the blink of an eye.

Let us go back to the quick start gallop Ward mentioned. Markham also talks about the necessity to learn this maneuver. But notice what he says at the end.

“Passe a Cariere and stop close
This the Souldier shall doe by thrusting the horse violently forward both with his legs and bodie, and giving libertie to the Bridle. As soone as the Horse is started into his gallop, hee shall give him the even stroake of his Spurres, once or twice together, and make the Horse runne to the hight of his full speede, then being at the end of the Cariere (which will not bee above the sixe score or eight score) he shall then draw up his Bridle-hand very hard and constantly, and laying the calues of both his legges gently to the Horses sides, make the Horse stop close to the ground, with onely a comely Aduancement. And this serveth for all manner of Charges whether it bee Horse against Horse, of Horse against Foote.” [p 52]

What Markham seems to be saying is that at the end of the charge the troopers horse should be galloping. This would explain why it was important to teach the horse to immediately breakout into a charge. If Markham and Ward are describing the same event, in the process of dropping the pistols and grasping the sword, the trooper is to immediately launch his mount into a gallop.

There are some good reasons for this and there are other aspects of cavalry charges we still need to discuss. However, that will have to wait for another posting. Oh, I found my Cruso.

Rich

One of the purposes of this blog is to explore these errors of interpretation and the holes in our understanding. In doing so I will quote from various historians but those I challenge will not be named. If you want to know who I’m talking about send me an email and I’ll be happy to name names. However, in this blog the idea is to attack ideas not historians. I do make an exception with bloggers. There very existence imply a give and take of criticism. I do want to stress that it is ideas I wish to challenge, not the blogger.

I think part of the problem we have in history is that it sees itself as a Social Science. I think this is unfortunate. The idea behind social science is current researchers build upon the work of past researchers. Social scientists have a number of tools available to them such as, statistical analysis, modeling, psychometrics. With these mathematical tools come generally accepted interpretive methods. Little of this applies to history. History tends to be a personal interpretive endeavor much like philosophy.

As I’ve read philosophy blogs I was struck by the amount of interpretive criticism that went on. I found it to be both instructive and interesting. I also thought this might be a useful method of critiquing historical analysis. I searched the world of military history blogs and found precious little of this kind of critical approach. Perhaps this is so because so many bloggers are graduate school students who don’t want to ruffle feathers. It may also be the case that some historians do not feel comfortable in this kind of endeavor. But it seems to me this is a worthwhile endeavor. And so let us begin.

I mentioned there were few military history which engaged in historical critical analysis. Investigations of a Dog is not one of them. I find Gavin’s blog to be refreshing. His is a military history blogs that talks about, of all things, military history. Not only that he talks about early modern military history. This makes him almost a saint in my eyes. Now you know with that kind of an introduction I’m bound to target a group of Gavin’s postings. You are right.

It was a series of Gavin’s postings on Cavalry Charges that convinced me to finally set a blog of my own. I thought of replying but the comments were closed. That was fine as I wanted to expand my comments beyond that which I felt comfortable in a reply. I think there are a number of errors and interpretations with which I took issue.

From Malcolm Wanklyn and Frank Jones, A Military History of the English Civil War (2004; ISBN: 0582772818) Gavin derived a rather unusual definition of the term ‘shock’ which involved a cavalry charge. Gavin came to the conclusion, with regards to cavalry charges, that ‘shock’ meant the crashing of two or more horses charging into one another much like bumper cars.

Assuming the two bodies of cavalry even got near each other and were going at any kind of speed, shock obsessed cavalrymen could have tried to steer their horses towards enemy horses in order to batter them down.

This unfortunate choice of definition colors the rest of his discussion of cavalry charges. A definition of this kind should point out not only what cavalry is designed to do but also what it is not supposed to do. By pointing out what it is not further clarifies what it does.

A case in point is Charles Oman’s definition of ‘shock’,

“When war is reduced to its simplest elements, there are only two ways in which an enemy can be met and beaten. Either shock-tactics or missile-tactics must be employed against him.”

Thus cavalry, like infantry, have two ways of dealing with the enemy. Either they can meet the enemy with shock or with missiles. He continues,

“In the one case [shock] the victor throws himself on his opponent, and worsts him in close combat by his numbers, the superiority of his weapons, or the greater strength and skill with which he wields them. In the second case he wins the day by keeping up such a constant and deadly rain of missiles that the enemy is destroyed or driven into demoralized flight before he can come to hand-strokes.”

Shock-tactics are not bumper cars. Shock is any attempt to close with an opponent in close combat. They do not require horses to physically meet head-on. If one wants to understand charge on the early modern battlefield one must come to grips with these too functions of cavalry: shock and missile. As I continue with my discussion of cavalry charges remember that shock is an attempt to meet with the enemy in close combat, melee. I might mention my own experience with horses includes breaking wild mustangs and herding cattle in Nevada.

Rich